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international institute of social studies, erasmus university rotterdam, The hague, The netherlands
ABSTRACT
Scholars continue to draw attention to the link between the war 
economy and post-war crime. The majority of these studies are about 
cases of civil war that ended with peace agreements. Sri Lanka’s civil 
war ended with a military victory for the state armed forces; thus, 
it can help shed new light on the above link. Situated in the war 
economy perspective, this article investigates the dominant types 
of crimes reported from post-war Sri Lanka and the mechanisms 
linking them with the war economy. The culture of impunity, 
continued militarisation and enduring corruption are identified as 
key mechanisms through which the war economy and post-war bodily 
and material crime are linked. It suggests, although the ‘victors’ peace’ 
achieved by state armed forces was able to successfully dismantle the 
extra-legal war economy run by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
it was responsible for promoting criminality in the post-war period. 
Overall, this points to the urgency of breaking away from legacies of 
the state war economy in the post-war period, before introducing 
programs of longer term political and economic reform.
Introduction
The literature on civil war termination and post-war peacebuilding draws attention to inter-
connections and continuities between the war economy and post-war crime. They are mainly 
explained through a rational choice approach to conflict. Often, these studies highlight the 
role of greed, the resource curse, production of illicit goods, warlords and competition for 
the monopoly of power and violence by multiple sovereigns as drivers of violent conflicts.1 
Breaking this link has been found to be important for realising positive peace.2 However, 
not all civil wars share the same characteristics in terms of their causes and the dynamics, 
during and after the war.3 The dynamics in post-war Sri Lanka are quite different from the 
wars that ended in the post-Cold War period with a peace agreement often facilitated by 
external intervention. Instead, the dynamics in post-war Sri Lanka are largely set by the 
military victory by the state armed forces. This allowed the state not only to defeat the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but also to fully reclaim a monopoly of ‘legitimate 
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violence’.4 Sri Lanka thus presents an opportunity to understand different manifestations of 
the link between the war economy and post-war crime, in a context of victors’ peace.5
This article investigates the mechanisms and the relationship between the Sri Lankan war 
economy and dominant types of post-war crime in Sri Lanka. This article primarily relies on 
secondary data, including academic literature, newspaper articles, official crime data and 
policy documents and national and international reports compiled by civil society organi-
sations. The official data related to war, peace and development are all highly contested. 
Unreliability and manipulation of data are serious issues particularly in societies that have 
experienced conflict and the war-to-peace transition, like Sri Lanka.6 For instance, the number 
of war deaths remains subject to controversy.7 So do the rosy pictures painted by state 
authorities about the country’s economic performance during and after the war. MacGinty 
described the latter as the ‘state’s role in cooking the books’.8 As observed by UNODC’s9 
Global Study on Homicides, Sri Lanka also suffers from incomplete data and non-availability 
of baseline data on homicides committed during the pre-war period. This makes it difficult 
to compare and contrast pre-war, war and post-war statistics. Given these limitations, author 
triangulated official data with limited primary data collected in Colombo at the end of April 
and mid-November in 2017. They were collected through informal discussions held with 
members of civil society organisations based in Colombo, a senior Member of Parliament 
(MP) representing Jaffna District and a senior police officer attached to the South Colombo 
Police Division.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. First, it offers a brief introduction to the 
legacies of the war. Next, key aspects of the war economy are presented. In the following 
section, major developments in post-war crime are analysed by looking at two dominant 
types of grave crimes (bodily and material) and the main mechanisms through which these 
crimes are linked with the war economy. The final section summarises these interactions 
and pleads for tailored strategies to reform the state and the polity.
The end of war
In May 2009, after nearly three decades of fighting, the civil war between the state armed 
forces (backed by some of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority) and the LTTE (backed by some 
of the Sri Lankan Tamil minority) came to an end. It was declared a military victory for the 
state armed forces. The way in which the war ended rekindled a ‘give war a chance’ thesis, 
not only in Sri Lanka but elsewhere in the world.10 It also debunked speculations by military 
and academic pundits that war could only end with a peace agreement. Against a back-
ground of ‘peace fatigue’, after repeated failed peace negotiations in a fractured political 
system,11 the government going for an all-war strategy was not a complete surprise. Also, 
as expected, military victory came at a huge cost in lives; the number of casualties in the 
war has been estimated at around 100,000,12 including at least 40,000 civilian deaths during 
the last few months of the war alone.13 On the economic front, the civil war affected Sri 
Lanka’s production and exports, as well as the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. It also 
lowered the country’s long-term growth rate. The direct and indirect economic costs of the 
war were mainly borne by the government. Especially, costs related to the damages to vital 
physical and social infrastructure are significant. The total costs borne by the government 
were estimated at 1.7 times the GDP of Sri Lanka in 1996.14
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The end of the war has been marked by several other problematic legacies. Whilst the 
international community initially praised President Rajapaksa’s government for ending the 
war, the way the final phase of the war was conducted was heavily criticised. This was fol-
lowed by repeated calls for an international war crime investigation15 and probing into critical 
incidents of human rights violations during the last months of the war.16 Draconian laws, 
like the emergency laws and the Prevention of Terrorism Act,17 are accused of protecting 
the armed forces from legal prosecution for these crimes. Post-war Sri Lanka also saw an 
increase in the number of grave crimes recorded.18 This increase parallels trends reported 
from other cases of civil war ending, from El Salvador and Guatemala to the Balkans and 
Colombia.19 Homicide20 is a key type of grave crime often reported as increasing in these 
cases but this was not the case in Sri Lanka. According to the UNODC database, the rate of 
intentional homicides per 100,000 people fell dramatically in the post-war period from 10.16 
during wartime to just 2.79 in 2013. However, as UNODC cautions, the decreasing number 
of homicides might be due to overlapping records of deaths resulting from intentional hom-
icide and civilian casualties attributed to the conflict during the active years of war.
From the perspective of the ‘new war’ framework,21 persistent institutional weaknesses, 
illicit economies, criminal groups and availability of lootable natural resources are key factors 
encouraging criminality in the post-war contexts. As studies on Sri Lanka show, post-war 
crime and violence might be linked with mechanisms including militarisation, low institu-
tional capacity, corruption, youth unemployment or circulation of weapons, either alone or 
in combination.22 As a follow-up to previous works, and owing to the dynamics set by the 
‘victors’ peace’ in Sri Lanka, this article is framed within the classical state-based war economy 
perspective to further investigate these links and mechanisms.23
Sri Lanka’s war economy24
The war economy in Sri Lanka can be divided into two parts: the state-based war economy 
controlled by the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL), and the extra-legal war economy, run by 
the LTTE.25 This distinction is analytical rather than empirical. It highlights the key actors who 
in their main spheres of operation in real life became embedded in one or the other war 
economy. Both parts of the war economy were aimed at fulfilling the military priority of 
defeating the enemy. Naturally, the LTTE was the prime target of the state-controlled war 
economy and vice versa. The state-controlled war economy was sustained by various 
Sinhalese majority backed governments, which assumed state power from 198326. The state’s 
dedicated efforts to mobilise and allocate valuable resources for winning the war happened 
in parallel to periodic investments made in pursuing peace talks with the enemy (usually 
more dependent on donor financial support).27 As a result, military spending gradually grew 
to constitute a significant portion of the state’s total spending. Much of this was dedicated 
to bearing the cost of the growing armed forces: in 1985, the number of military service 
personnel was estimated at 21,600. In 2014, this climbed to more than ten times that, an 
estimated 223,100. In the same period, Sri Lanka’s military expenditure grew in real terms 
by 29%.28
Thus, although the increase in the GOSL armed forces directly fulfils military and combat 
functions, it also has political and economic expediency.29 The additional employment 
opportunities the military offers to the country’s young Sinhalese has helped Sinhalese 
political regimes’ social power base in society.30 The majority of the front-line military 
positions are filled by the poorer segments of Sinhalese youth, excluded from other, more 
lucrative white-collar government jobs. As Venugopal’s research showed,31 employment in 
the military absorbed more than half of young Sinhala men from four poor districts: Ampara, 
Trincomalee, Polonnaruwa and Moneragala. Since the end of the war, in a fragile political 
system and an ailing economy, maintaining this massive number of military cadres has 
become more than necessary. Thus, both post-war governments have devoted a significant 
portion of the country’s national income to the military budget (in 2016, the military budget 
was approximately US$ 289,160,000).32 The increase can be seen for instance, in the differ-
ence between the 2015 defence appropriation (US$ 2.22 billion) and its military spending 
in 2016, an estimated US$ 2.89 billion.33
A large portion of the military budget has been used to import weapons.34 Unlike coun-
tries at war that are also domestic arms producers, Sri Lanka’s war did not give a positive 
boost to its economy.35 As a result, a significant portion of the defence budget was met by 
imposing various war-specific tax schemes, like the ‘Defence Levy’, ‘Save the Nation Levy’ 
and ‘Nation Building Levy’.36 The ‘Defence Levy’ was introduced in 1992, then renamed as 
the ‘National Security Levy’. This scheme continued until 1997 and was paid by any person 
who carried out business, whether manufacturing, importing or providing a service. The 
‘Save the Nation Levy’ was imposed on any working person except those in the national 
police, security and military forces. It was to be paid on a quarterly basis and taxed citizens 
with an annual income over LKR 45,000 at 2% of their total income, and those who earned 
over LKR 90,000 at 3% of their total income. In the first half of the year 2000, the National 
Security Levy helped increase government’s earnings by 8%. It was also imposed on the 
service sector, initially at 5.5% and subsequently increased to 6.5%. Alongside this, it is plau-
sible to argue that the prolonged supply of humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka by external 
actors (US$ 74.3 million as of 201337) provided an additional cushion for the government, 
allowing it to spend more on defence.
Furthermore, corruption in the defence sector by the political and military elites is believed 
to have contributed to the conception of a parallel-shadow economy. Corruption in the 
defence sector is difficult to uncover, partly due to the systematic silencing of critical jour-
nalists and civil society members.38 However, there is evidence to suggest that large-scale 
corruption took place in the defence sector during the war. One prominent example is the 
uninvestigated scandal of the purchase of MiG-27 aircraft from Ukraine.39
In addition to high-level corruption, instances of petty corruption in the defence and 
security sectors have been reported. They range from members of the defence forces and 
police receiving bribes from suspected LTTE members to protect them from imprisonment, 
and bribes to buy support to strengthen military forces’ positions in the north and the east. 
One example is the monetarily significant deal alleged to have been struck in 2004 by the 
military and the ruling political regime with the breakaway LTTE group led by Colonel 
Karuna.40 There are many other examples of corruption linked to the defence 
establishment.41
LTTE and the extra-legal war economy42
Creating a separate state was LTTE’s main goal. Therefore, additionally to its military activities, 
LTTE also heavily invested in forming a sophisticated administrative apparatus. This dual 
strategy allowed the organisation to act as a quasi-state in the north and the east.42 Over 
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the years, the LTTE has developed a parallel economy of its own, operating outside of the 
national and the international legal and regulatory frameworks. One of the main modalities 
of operation was through sophisticated forms of extra-legal transnational networks. As 
alleged by the former Sri Lankan army commander, General Rohan Daluwatte, the LTTE 
sustained its de facto rule in the north and some parts in the east by looting the humanitarian 
supplies sent by the government to the war-affected areas. These supplies include medical 
supplies, food and other essentials.43 Later, the LTTE-run war economy was implicated in 
illegal shipping operations that spanned from South India to other Asian countries and 
thereafter to Eastern Europe and Africa. Prior to 2005, the organisation itself owned 20 vessels 
approximately and a considerable number of trawlers.44 Among other related activities, the 
establishment of a number of boatyard companies based in East Asia (Indonesia and the 
Philippines) has been noted. These companies were allegedly used for transporting arms 
and ammunition under the pretext of cargo deliveries. Sea piracy also brought revenues to 
the LTTE, posing a considerable threat to the maritime security in the region.45 The LTTE is 
also alleged to have engaged in arms and ammunition smuggling from the Far East and 
Eastern European countries. The bulk of its military hardware was purchased from North 
Korea with some from Ukraine and Bulgaria. It also developed a parallel tax regime by intro-
ducing a range of direct and indirect taxes in the LTTE-controlled areas and in some territories 
held by the Sri Lankan government.46 At some point, the Tamil public servants were even 
asked to contribute a certain percentage of their monthly salary as income tax. Manufacturers 
and service providers were taxed a percentage of their monthly income. Farmers and those 
involved in fishing were pressured to contribute a share of their output either in cash or kind. 
By maximising the opportunities opened up during the intermitted brief phases of ceasefires, 
the organisation also raised revenues through indirect taxes in the form of customs fees on 
goods brought into the LTTE-controlled territory. Other sources of income included a vehicle 
registration tax in the LTTE-controlled areas and a tax on property transactions in Jaffna.
By 2001, the number of Tamils living abroad was estimated at 600,000–800,000. Due to 
the war, the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils found refuge in Western Europe, India, Australia 
and North America.47 According to a report published by the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Services, members of the Tamil diaspora living in Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Scandinavian countries have been funding the LTTE 
financially.48 According to the US State Department, the LTTE exploited the Tamil diaspora 
to raise funds and supplies.49 Propaganda, finance and logistics were the main forms of 
contribution to the LTTE’s war economy from Tamils living abroad. Among the diaspora, 
some were willingly contributors whereas others were coerced. Approximately 80% of the 
LTTE’s US$ 82 million annual budget was generated from diaspora contributions (and rev-
enues generated from international trade, enterprise and investments).50 In the late 1990s, 
the amount of money sent from the Canadian diaspora alone was estimated at between C$ 
1 million and more than C$ 12 million a year. In 2005 and 2006, the LTTE used various meth-
ods and channels to increase its efforts to raise money for a ‘final war’; these included door-
to-door collections by overseas members of the LTTE and LTTE-linked organisations. They 
also devised more targeted methods, such as approaching wealthy businesses and profes-
sionals, from whom the organisation demanded significant sums of money. In Canada, ordi-
nary families were typically pressured to give between C$ 2500 and C$ 5000, whereas some 
wealthy businesses were pressured to give C$ 100,000.
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On the home front, the LTTE also put pressure on overseas Tamils visiting their relatives 
in Sri Lanka to contribute. The assessed ‘rate’ was often C$ 1, £ 1, or € 1 per day for the length 
of time each individual has lived in the West. Such visitors were not allowed to leave the 
country until they produced the requested amount; in some cases, the LTTE also confiscated 
their passports until the money was paid.51 Zunzer noted that contradictory to some reports, 
not all the funds generated by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) – a frontline 
LTTE-related humanitarian entity formed by the Tamil diaspora – were used to support mil-
itary activities. The funds generated by the TRO were mainly used for development work 
and for paying the overheads to sustain the embryonic institutional structures of the qua-
si-Tamil state in the north and east of the country.52
Following the breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire, the LTTE also stepped up its recruitment 
drive. By this time the organisation had approximately 30,000 personnel, including both 
voluntary and involuntary recruits. LTTE recruits included a large number of civilians who 
had served in the Illapaddei force, an auxiliary force reserve on a LKR 7000 monthly salary, 
used for both for defensive and offensive operations. In addition, child soldiers constituted 
a significant number of the LTTE cadres. This is especially noted in the LTTE’s eastern faction 
led by Karuna.53 Towards the end of 2007, a total of 6,000 children was reported to have 
joined, although the actual number of child soldiers is believed to be much higher.54 Similar 
to the government’s military recruits, the LTTE recruits also had functions other than strategic 
military combat. In particular, they had important legitimating functions in LTTE-controlled 
areas.55 LTTE ‘recruitment’ was not only a mechanism for exploiting the vulnerability of both 
individuals and groups but also a protective mechanism against the Sri Lankan state. As the 
war economy literature suggests, the latter proposition usually involved convincing the 
potential members that they would be safer inside the organisation than outside.56 Given 
the controversial laws and practices of the Sri Lankan state – for example the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA – operational since 1973) and the Code of Criminal Procedure Act (CCPA), 
both of which were generously applied against the Tamil youth and the suspected LTTE 
members (as well as for the anti-state Sinhalese youth-led political group of Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna) – it might not have required much effort for the LTTE leadership to convince 
Tamil youth in particular to join the organisation, sometimes even without a monetary incen-
tive. Although many of its economic activities were coerced and quasi-voluntary, the LTTE 
was able to legitimise these by invoking a sense of Tamil nationalism, outside threat and 
enemy imagery.57
Linking the war economy and post-war grave crime
As David Keen observed, post-conflict contexts are unlikely to see a clean break from violence 
to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to 
accountability.58 Peacebuilding also involves transforming war economies into peace econ-
omies. Thus, a successful and sustainable transition requires a nuanced understanding of 
the dynamics in the post-war contexts. To this end, crime-related developments and the 
identification of possible links of these with the war economy are crucial.59
Broadly speaking, post-war Sri Lanka is marked by the intermeshing of crimes committed 
during and after the war. The crimes committed during the war are mainly the alleged war 
crimes committed during its last phase. Many reports both locally and internationally impli-
cate the state armed forces and LTTE equally (e.g. UN expert panel report on the direction 
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of the Secretary-General, the UN High Commission for Human Rights and the locally com-
missioned Udalagama and Paranagama Commission report).60 So far, the United Nations 
has passed a number of resolutions calling for cooperation from the Sri Lankan state author-
ities to conduct a credible investigation into the alleged war crimes committed by both 
parties.61 These calls are supported by many Western governments (including the US and 
the EU) and the majority of the Tamil diaspora. Ironically, the former are accused of selling 
deadly weapons to the Sri Lankan Government during the last phase of the war. For instance, 
UK’s arms exports were worth more than £13.6 million.62 It is not only the net value of these 
weapons that should deserve attention but how these arms deals by-passed the existing 
1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export.63 Like the localised war economy in Sri Lanka, 
these controversial arms sales point to the importance of the transnational scale, in which 
Sri Lanka’s war economy was firmly embedded and found sustenance.
The official statistics show a gradual increase in grave crimes in the post-war period with 
minor fluctuations in some sub-categories. The increasing brutality and frequency with which 
they are committed are noted too.64 The trend of increasing grave crimes was first reported 
only in the last few years. It has alluded to various factors such as rapid economic growth, 
social development and changes in individual lifestyles.65 Given the unreliability of official 
data, it is difficult to demonstrate a significant rise in the number of grave crimes just by 
following the official records. In this regard, one noteworthy revelation by a senior police 
officer interviewed for this article is the new tendency among various police divisions to 
downplay and under-report grave crimes. This is mainly done to secure promotions and 
show better service records to access benefits related to job performance.66 To garner the 
fuller picture, it is also necessary to triangulate the official statistics, prevailing social dis-
courses (both mainstream and the marginal) and primary qualitative data. The developments 
related to the post-war grave crime and their possible links with the war economy are barely 
acknowledged in local social discourses. However, researchers have begun explaining some 
of the mechanisms that link the war and some of the developments related to post-war 
grave crime. These studies are primarily situated in psychosocial,67 gender,68 criminology 
and media-based69 theories using primary qualitative data. As a follow up to these studies, 
deriving from a political-economy based analysis, a more nuanced picture of the link between 
the war economy and the post-war grave crime is presented below.
Bodily crimes
Bodily crime is widely reported from post-war Sri Lanka and between 2009 and 2013 the 
number of complaints received by the police for investigation of bodily crimes of a sexual 
nature alone increased by 34%.70 Since the end of the war, many cases of abductions and 
disappearances have been reported from the former war zone. A person has been abducted 
or ‘disappeared’ roughly once every five days.71 Women and girls – particularly among the 
internally displaced people (IDP) – are the main targets of these incidents. Trafficking of 
women, especially widows and single mothers, and rape have been reported from the war-af-
fected areas. As the regional patterns suggest, at least five incidents of rape have been 
recorded daily in the north and east of Sri Lanka since 2009. Since most cases are not even 
reported, the official figure could be even higher.72 As the Organisation of Women for Rights 
has highlighted, in the north and the east, the majority of the victims of such crimes (rape, 
sexual violence, torture, abduction and arbitrary detention) are allegedly connected to the 
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state armed forces. The lack of domestic investigations undertaken with regard to crimes 
reported in the post-war period is considered a continuing crime against humanity.73
A considerable number of sexual crimes have also been reported from districts of 
Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Kurunegala and Monaragala, which are adjacent to the former 
war zone. During the war, these areas played an interlocutory role connecting the war in the 
north with the south by serving as major recruitment hubs for the state armed forces. In 
these areas, and especially in Anuradhapura, brothels held sex-trafficked women and chil-
dren. This, the US Department of State said, was linked to the area’s role as ‘a major transit 
point for members of the Sri Lankan armed forces heading north’.74 The former combatants 
from the state armed forces have been blamed for most of the bodily crimes reported from 
these areas. Some blame the lack of systematic psycho-social support to the military for the 
increasing number of bodily crimes committed by the army soldiers.75
The possibility of soldiers’ involvement in or planning of these criminal activities was also 
suggested by De Votta.76 According to him, an estimated 35,000 state armed forces who 
were stationed in Jaffna (the provincial capital of the Northern Province after the end of the 
war) could have had a stake in these incidents. A more recent phenomenon called ‘grease 
devil attacks’ carried out by naked or semi-naked men smeared in grease sexually assaulting 
women has also been reported in the post-war north and in the east, suspected as the works 
of the armed forces.77 These local accusations also resonate with incidents of the systematic 
sexual abuse and rape of children reported against the Sri Lanka soldiers who served in the 
UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti and the Central African Republic. So far, the Sri Lankan 
authorities have failed to conduct any formal investigation into these incidents.78
Material crimes
A higher number of material crimes is also reported from post-war Sri Lanka. Since 2014, 
the share of material crime has comprised an average of 40% of all grave crimes committed.79 
According to the Police Narcotic Bureau, a majority of these crimes are related to drug traf-
ficking and drug abuse, both criminal offences under law.80 The exact increase in these 
crimes is difficult to pin down. Non-comparable data sets following the introduction of the 
new crime category (minor offences) and politicians’ meddling in the reporting81 and inves-
tigation of these crimes partly explains this. However, the relatively high number of material 
crimes is confirmed by periodic statements issued by the law enforcement authorities. 
Further, as noted by the police officer interviewed for this study, material crimes such as 
burglary and theft involving firearms have also been linked with the widespread availability 
of small arms and light weapons since the end of the war and their frequent use by (ex) 
members of the Civil Defence Forces. This connection has also been confirmed by the senior 
superintendent of police, citing a recently compiled set of data collected across the island.82 
Although making an absolute link between material crimes and the war economy requires 
systematic collection of evidence and further substantiation, there are several mechanisms 
at play through which the two might be connected.
In general, economic difficulties increase the number of material grave crimes.83 This 
raises the contrast between post-war reality and the rhetoric of the Rajapakse regime. The 
regime boasted of rapid economic growth during its tenure amidst the war and in the post-
war period. In 2011, it even forecasted an average of 8.1%84 economic growth. Based on its 
own figures, the regime saw no problem in delivering the promised peace-economic 
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dividends. However, real post-war economic growth has been calculated at 2.5%.85 It showed 
a gloomy economic scenario with consistently high levels of inflation (6.22% in 2010, 6.74% 
in 2011, 7.53% in 2012 and 6.94% in 2013). This inflation only started to decrease since 2015.86
It is widely believed that the extension of the war economy into the post-war period 
through further militarisation and high defence expenditure siphoned out resources that 
would have been available to generate the promised economic dividends related to peace 
and to address the challenge of widening inequality.87 Even the claimed rapid economic 
boom (infrastructure development, improved agricultural productivity) in the north and the 
east in the post-war period has become a cause of concern since it came with political strings 
attached. These made inroads for further militarisation and securitisation of the land and 
the population.88 The resources dedicated to maintaining a 450,000-strong military force 
(currently the ratio of military cadre to population is 1:5), in the absence of an active armed 
conflict or imminent threat of such, are particularly burdensome for the economy.89
Further, during the Rajapaksa regime, the military was re-deployed to perform non-mil-
itary activities. It was assigned a key role in the post-war development strategy. The military 
was involved in large-scale property development ventures and in state-sponsored mega-in-
frastructure development projects (such as building roads, bridges, houses and sports sta-
diums). To facilitate this further, in 2012 the budget of the Defence Ministry was merged 
with the Urban Development Authority, yielding a combined budget of about 229.9 billion 
Sri Lankan Rupees. At that time, this combined budget was the largest of any government 
ministry.90 All these were justified by highlighting the need for continued securitisation and 
the need to preserve the high (4.8% figures contested) economic growth achieved during 
the war.91
The regime’s new development strategy negatively affected ordinary people’s lives.92 It 
dismantled the wartime coping economy in the north as a result of pursuing a national 
security state, which let the military to occupy and even forcibly annex vast amounts of 
fertile land in the north and east.93 The military is also accused of driving away impoverished 
women from their livelihood activities (i.e. small-scale subsistence farming and selling home-
grown produce in informal markets). Overall, the might of the military and state patronage 
military received created unfair conditions and unfair competition for the women in the 
coping economy.94
Although up to 2015 the Rajapakse regime spent massive sums of money borrowed from 
Chinese banks at a commercial rate, the dividends of these large-scale investments (in the 
form of large-scale reconstruction and development projects) have not reached average 
people.95 Even allocations for essential services such as health and education have experi-
enced a rapid decline, whilst military expenditure continues to rise.96 Meanwhile, repeating 
the earlier patterns following failed peace-making efforts, the promised economic dividends 
of peace also did not reach to the south where most of the Sinhalese live. Some blame this 
on the workings of the country’s electoral system and on unfavourable conditions imposed 
by the World Bank.97 In sum, higher military spending, combined with factors like droughts, 
a deepening budget deficit and a high international debt to GDP ratio, has meant a looming 
economic crisis. These events suggest a link between the war’s entrenching effects on the 
economy in the post-war period and the increasing number of material crimes.
Increasing unemployment levels is another mechanism that may explain the link between 
war economy and post-war material crime. Sri Lanka’s unemployment rate was 4.4% in 2014, 
4.6% in 2015 and 4.9% in 2016.98 According to national data, youth unemployment is 
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currently as high as 14.2%. Youth unemployment is remarkably similar in areas directly and 
indirectly hit by the war. For instance, the southern districts of Matara and Kegalle trail only 
slightly behind the directly war-affected districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi and Ampara.99 
Tragically, as evident in various reports, the post-war economic woes experienced by the 
youth are manifested in many forms. Among these, the inclination to commit material crimes 
as well as bodily crimes, such as suicides, are notable. Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) due to financial hardships and loss of livelihoods have been identified as 
main causes for the majority of the youth suicides reported from the North.100
When probing material crimes, corruption also deserves scrutiny. Under Sri Lankan law, 
corruption is a criminal offence but it has been a persistent problem in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka 
ranks as a highly corrupt country in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 
As World Governance Indicators show, control of corruption has not improved over the last 
15 years. There has been a lack of enforcement of anti-corruption legislation, often leaving 
powerful political elites who commit such acts unpunished.101 Political tendencies of the 
authoritarian style of governance, militarised state and centralisation of powers that emerged 
and sustained during and after the war and especially during the Rajapaksa regime, have 
led to enduring corruption.102 Coupled with the war-related burdens laid on the economy, 
corruption further reduced the capacity of the state to generate economic growth and a fair 
redistribution system. As recent literature shows,103 increasing criminality is one manifesta-
tion of the combined effects of inequality, mistrust and corruption. Promises to eradicate 
corruption (along with other measures of good governance) were the backbone of President 
Sirisena’s election campaign. Sadly, so far the government has been unable to make any 
satisfactory progress.104 Neither the end of the war nor the regime change in 2015 has sev-
ered the link between structurally rooted corruption, the economy and politics.105 The con-
tinued high level of corruption in the post-war period106 not only undermines and delays 
economic recovery but also potentially leaves room for a relapse into violence, criminality 
and social conflict.
Conclusion
Despite the difficulty of obtaining data, Sri Lanka is an interesting case study for literature 
on the war economy and post-war crimes. Although it is nearly a decade since the war ended, 
the legacies of the war continue to manifest in different forms. An increase in post-war grave 
crime (in terms of bodily and material) is one notable form. In this background, this article 
examined the dominant types of crimes reported from post-war Sri Lanka and the mecha-
nisms linking them with the war economy. Bodily crime is the most dominant type of crime 
reported from former war ravaged north and the east. The increased number of bodily crimes 
mostly reported from these areas in the immediate years after the war links with the dynamics 
set by a victor’s peace and the impunity enjoyed by the state armed forces. This link is further 
established by the state’s continued efforts at the post-war militarisation of the economy 
and society. The only favourable outcome brought by the victor’s peace was the ability to 
delink the LTTE from Sri Lanka’s post-war crime scenario. This was possible due to strong 
discipline inherited by the former LTTE cadres during their time in the organisation, the 
government’s efforts to demobilise ex-LTTE members, and continued militarisation and pur-
suit of national security state since the end of the war.
72   S. JAYASUNDARA-SMITS
In the post-war period, material crime is the most dominant type of crime reported from 
the southern part of the country, where majority Sinhalese live. This article also identified 
the culture of impunity, a lack of progress in generating peace-economic dividends, and 
uncontrolled corruption as additional mechanisms linking the war economy and the post-
war material crimes. This is further intensified by external factors such as continued droughts, 
the negative trade relationships developed with the West (especially the EU) and the loss of 
access to important concessionary development aid schemes as Sri Lanka graduated to 
middle-income status in 2010. However, the inner workings of these mechanisms require 
further investigation, through more systematic data and evidence gathering.
Overall, the developments noted related to Sri Lanka’s post-war grave crime share simi-
larities as well as differences with other post-war contexts. One notable difference is the 
state’s role in the promotion of criminality in the guise of a victor’s peace. This was especially 
observed during the 2009–2015 period. A country’s tenuous economic base, destructive 
political culture (of elites and their supporters alike) and a flawed political system certainly 
has the ability to produce and reproduce the link between the war economy and post-war 
grave crime. Thus, a successful post-war transition will require tailor-made strategies target-
ing reforms to the moral, political and economic edifice of both the state and its polity.
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